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 The Destructive Draw of Historical Determinism 
 Conflict and violence are unavoidable facts of human history. While conflicts over access 
to resources are common in the animal world, conflicts due to ideas seem to be uniquely human. 
These interpersonal and intergroup struggles occur for many complex reasons, but those that are 
based on deeply held fundamental beliefs can be the most dangerous due to the force of 
conviction that drives adherents. The study of these beliefs that drive people to violence requires 
interactions between many different disciplines, most notably those of the humanities. 
 Talk about politics and religion covers a massive swath of information found in the field 
of philosophy. Political science and philosophy are deeply intertwined; in many ways the first 
documented philosophers were also the first major players in the field of political science. 
Socrates, through Plato in his Republic, sets out to define justice and in doing so lands squarely 
in the terrain of political philosophy, arguing over the correct way for people to live in relation to 
one another. Plato uses the model of a city to help him explain his idea of a tripartite soul and 
spends a large portion of the book discussing his idea of the perfect city and how relations 
between people and classes within that city would look. Many philosophers, in fact, have 
devoted books to the way cities and civilizations should run and how people should interact, and 
it is exactly these prescriptive notions that can make political philosophy and ideology so 
dangerous when imposed from above. 
 The term “ideology” is used in a variety of ways, most typically with a negative 
connotation to denigrate or simplify opposing ideas (Freeden 3). It has also been used to denote 
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everything from circular systems of self-encouraging belief to a classification of some of the 
major forms of political belief systems like liberalism, fascism, socialism, etc., to a catchall term 
for any system of thought. However, for the purposes of this paper, “ideology” will be used in 
the way most generally accepted in the scholarship since the writings of Antonio Gramsci, a 
Italian Communist political philosopher in the early 20th century. Since his writing, and the 
clashes of different political philosophies during WWII, in political theory, ideologies are 
understood as “promoters of non-negotiable principles that sought the status of universal truths” 
(Freeden 8). In this way, the political nears the religious in its claims. This clashing can be seen 
most clearly throughout the 20th century in the actions of Nazis, Stalinists, and even 
McCarthyites who each attempted to intertwine their ideologies with the culture and heritage in 
which they found themselves, and grew out of, throughout the 20th century. These ideologies set 
their adherents in opposition to one another on the most basic levels, seeing those that disagreed, 
not as intellectual challengers with which to engage in good faith arguments, but instead as a 
civilization ending threat. In weaving themselves with the culture of their host nations, these 
ideologies--in part-- became political myths. 
Political myth can be thought of as a “process of continual work on a basic narrative 
pattern that changes according to the circumstances” (Bottici et al. 319). The purpose of political 
myth is to provide a group significance in relation to their political environment in a way that 
provides a framework that helps make sense of their current position and understanding of future 
events. The creation of a narrative framework for viewing politics is not merely a scholarly 
process that is used to think about the world, but also a kind of prescription for how to act in the 
world. All of these elements found in political myth are also found in religion. In the view of 
historical determinists, politics and religion share many commonalities aside from those 
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previously mentioned. Religion, however, insofar as it is organized and claims that morals come 
from God, vests the authoritative prescriptions it gives in a supreme or divine force. Religious 
adherents often raise this divestment of moral authority to a cosmic level to put any subsequent 
pronouncements outside the scope of normal human argumentation. When this logic enters the 
political realm and begins being forced onto those who do not see legitimacy in the authority of 
that policy, problems begin to arise that are not easily solved. 
One such ideology that intertwines religious elements into political frameworks is 
historical determinism. Historical determinism can be understood as the idea that future events 
are predestined, usually by an esoteric or economic force. This is accompanied by the belief that 
there is a certain group of enlightened people that know what this future outcome will be. These 
people are also often convinced that it is their duty to help bring about this historical synthesis. 
While there are different iterations of historical determinism that can be critiqued, this paper will 
be focusing on some of the most influential. Specifically, the connection between a historical 
determinism as imagined by Hegel which was then adapted into Marxist-Leninism and later 
Stalinism; the racial philosophy that motivative Nazism; and the fundamentalist religious 
apocalypticism that lies behind some versions of Christianity and Islam. This historical 
determinist viewpoint in these ideologies gives its adherents the belief that they hold the moral 
high ground, that victory is inevitable, and that their opposition is merely an obstacle to the ideal 
society that is to come. 
 Historicism is rooted in the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a German 
idealist philosopher of the 19th century. Hegel, the father of the philosophy of history, used and 
helped to bring to prominence a dialectical view of history. Hegel based a large part of his 
philosophy of history upon the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant, in his 1784 work Idea for a 
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Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, laid out the idea that there is perhaps a 
regular movement in history that has a path unwritten by individual actors (Kant 1). In this work, 
Kant anthropomorphizes “Nature” imbuing it with a sense of agency, to act and guide processes 
in the world. This aspect of Kant’s work can be tied to the Judeao-Christian tradition, as Kant 
states that Nature gives man free will, and has created the environment in such a way that it will 
constantly challenge and drive humanity forward in a teleological sense (Kant 3). Kant is 
explicitly using religious gesturing to combine traditional notions of providence with the 
secularized language of nature. The final purpose of this literal force of Nature is the creation of 
a perfect universal society, which requires the whole of humanity to join together. 
From Kant’s perspective, the wars and strife which have ravaged humanity and that 
continue to rage are steppingstones of frightened groups of people each trying to negotiate better 
relationships with each other. Kant believes that history evinces mankind becoming more 
cultured, which he measures through art and science, and becoming slightly more moral, which 
must come through education as proof that history is guided by Nature. While he declines the 
possibility of knowledge of the inner processes and the specific ways Nature works in its 
progressing course, he does see a generalized route to Utopia. The anarchic and harsh state of 
nature which forces people to unite into nations can also be applied to the state of international 
relations. Seeing the problem of the security dilemma, the solution offered by Kant in his eighth 
thesis is revolutionary acts within a state. These revolutionary actions will spur neighboring 
states to realize the instability will disrupt the liberal order and intervene. This gives the 
opportunity for outside forces to act as mediators and sets the stage for an international system of 
governance (Kant 7). Though Kant acts in the world of ideas, this can be read as a dangerous 
policy prescription. 
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 Advocating for revolution is dangerous, for those revolutionaries and government 
officials involved and for the political system of the state as a whole, even giving Kant the 
benefit of the doubt that he is only advocating for revolutionary action against an authoritarian 
government, not just for provoking chaos of the fuel of creating progress. Kant’s stated end goal 
was the formation of an international system of government that could develop a universal 
cosmopolitan condition (Kant 7). Kant is making the assumption that revolutionary action within 
a state will lead to third-party interventionism. This third-party intervention is then supposed to 
increase the level of democracy in the nation that was going through the revolution. This theory 
can be formulated into an empirically challengeable question. To get to the heart of the issue, the 
presence of interstate revolution and a third-party intervention will be granted. The question is: 
Does third party intervention increase the level of democracy in a country going through internal 
revolution? 
It is important to note that Kant died in 1804; a time before there was any major historical 
precedent for sovereign states to propose themselves as arbiters for the inner struggles of other 
states. However, since his death there has indeed been an increase in international institutions, 
though not exactly following the schematic of revolution that Kant offered. Though two of the 
major international arbiters, the League of Nations and the United Nations, did arise out of 
conflict neither arose out of interstate revolution. The League of Nations was formed by the 
victors of World War One. The League encompassed some of the most powerful nations at the 
time; however, it was largely unwilling to interfere with the events in other states. Famously, the 
League was able to stop neither the Japanese invasion of China, nor the rise and aggression of 
nationalists in Italy, Spain, or Germany. A result of this failure was the Second World War, 
which then spawned the UN. While the UN remains to this day and has intervened successfully 
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in a small number of cases, the scope of its failures comes to light much more often than its 
successes. 
Perhaps the most notable failure of the UN was the Rwandan Genocide where the UN is 
criticized for not intervening enough. The UN’s lack of action in Srebrenica and throughout the 
Bosnian War led to disappointment in the peacekeeper’s actions. While specific anecdotes and 
case studies are important, when judging the merits of an implemented political philosophy it is 
more useful to use larger data sets. 
 Since Kant’s time, the field of political science has begun more in-depth research on the 
connections between intervention and democracy. Kant argued that nations would realize that the 
instability in neighboring countries could negatively affect themselves. Nations would then be 
led to intervene in the conflicts of their neighbors to reduce the instability. This idea that 
neighboring nations intervening in conflicts would lead to an increase in stability and a liberal 
cosmopolitan spirit is not the case. Democratic countries who are likely to care not only about 
the stability of their neighbors, but also about helping to foster a liberal system face significant 
problems in international interventions. Democracies by their nature have both large selectorates, 
which are the people who have power to choose a leader, and large winning coalitions, which are 
the people whose support is necessary for the leader to win (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 
629). This greatly incentivizes democratic leaders to take actions that directly benefit members 
of their winning coalitions specifically, and members of the larger selectorate generally. 
While the loss of treasure and potential blood is easily felt by the selectorate, the 
selectorate gains very little from the knowledge that some country abroad is now democratic. 
Democratic leaders must find ways of directly associating foreign intervention with the public 
good of their nation; a task which is not necessarily easy to do. Democratic leaders must connect 
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their intervention with a direct good to their constituents. If some connection is made, it can be 
difficult to ensure the promise of good to the democratic intervener will be fulfilled by the 
fledgling democratic regime. The difficulty is due to the observation that whoever is elected in 
the fledgling democracy will need to appeal to their own base of selectorates whose interests are 
uncertain (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 631). This can be done successfully in some cases like 
the U.S. intervention in the political system of Germany and Japan after World War Two. There, 
the goal was to prevent another rise in militaristic fascism which has not gained power in either 
of those nations since the end of the war. However, in most cases problems of conflicting interest 
will occur, incentivizing democratic regimes to support friendly but stable autocracies. The UN 
Security Council, which might be the go-to option in Kant’s framework faces similar problems. 
The need to have agreement between the mix of democratic and non-democratic regimes that 
occupy the Security Council means there is an even wider array of interests that will need to be 
met in the new governing system. Autocratic regimes who have less of a selectorate to satiate 
can be expected to fit stances more precisely to the wants of those intervening. This makes it 
unlikely that the issues individual democracies have promoting democracy will be overcome 
when mixed into a collective with non-democratic actors (Voeten 846).  
This theory of third-party interventionism lowering the chances of an increase in liberal 
democracy in comparison to those states that have not experienced third-party intervention can 
be tested with data on countries which had civil wars, intrastate disputes, militarized interstate 
disputes, and interstate wars between 1946 and 2001. For the purposes of Bueno de Mesquita 
and Downs’ study third party interveners were any states that made a physical military presence 
in an area of fighting in any capacity (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 636). Regarding the UN, 
“targets of the UN fare no better and generally do worse than would have been expected had they 
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not suffered an intervention” in a measurement of their levels of democracy, according to Polity, 
in the period of time tracked until 10 years after the intervention (Bueno de Mesquita and Down 
643). Moreover, the study showed that interventions, even by democratic countries, actually 
reduce the rate of democratization relative to the expected secular trend without intervention. 
This historical trend severely undermines Kant’s theory of intervention leading to liberal 
democracy. 
Hegel takes Kant’s basic idea of historical trends revealing something more than the mere 
sum of human action and adds onto it, increasingly emphasizing the conflictual nature of the 
process. Hegel did not see human beings in a stagnant sense, locked between their split brutish 
and rational nature as Kant maintained. Hegel had the idea of a dialectic where two sides, called 
a thesis and antithesis, opposed one another and then clashed until a resolution was found, or one 
of the sides was destroyed. This conclusion is what he called synthesis. He applied this idea to 
history in his Philosophy of History, where he outlines changes in historical trends over time 
starting with the Greeks' society being changed by Socrates’ questioning of their societal norms 
and understandings. 
Though Hegel is doing philosophy and history, in a way he is also doing something 
similar to religion. Hegel’s metaphysics and historical dialectic are both tied to his idea of Spirit 
(Hegel 126). Absolute Spirit is what Hegel calls the ultimate reality, God, or Freedom. The Spirit 
can be known through pure reason and thoughtful cognition, as self-consciousness is the 
subjective form of spirit existing in the world. For the individual, religion is the vector of one's 
life through which they can get closest to Spirit because religion recognizes the True in its most 
real, abstract, form. The religion that a group of people have is the fundamental agreement on 
which they base their governance. In this way, Spirit, for Hegel, also takes an objective form in 
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the State which “is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its 
Freedom” (Hegel 62). He identifies it as such because the state is the union of the will of all of 
the individuals that make it up. Because the state is such a powerful entity, it is in the 
development of the State through history that Spirit can most readily be seen. 
Hegel combines these ideas and uses the idea of Spirit as a guiding principle behind the 
State, which is a collective rather than individual will, to say that different societies with varying 
religions and forms of governance have National Spirits which each are at different levels of 
development in and unity with Absolute Spirit. Spirit, on the world stage, acts as the “latent germ 
of being — a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself” that he calls the principle of 
development (Hegel 70). History is a teleological process guided by Spirit that manifests itself 
through the religion of groups of people collectivized into the State, which through a dialectical 
process eventually will move towards Freedom. So, the form of Heathenism followed by Roman 
citizens was necessary for the establishment of the Roman state, though as history and time 
advanced Heathenism gave way to Christianity, first in its Catholic form then furthered into its 
Protestant form, each shifting through dialectical clashes.  
Hegel’s ideas of a historical dialectic paired with his teleological view of history were 
extremely influential. They would later be used to change the world when they were taken up by 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, mixed with economics, and shifted to fit the materialistic, rather 
than idealist view of the world that Marx had. In his 1886 article, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End 
of Classical German Philosophy, Engels openly stated,  
“The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of 
readymade things, but as a complex of processes in which apparently stable, no less than 
their mind-images in our heads-- the concepts go through uninterrupted change of coming 
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into being and passing away-- in which in spite of all temporary regressions, a 
progressive development asserts itself in the end” (Saksena 543). 
This is emphasizing Engel’s belief that no matter the setbacks that may occur, progress will win 
out in the end. Instead of reason through religion being driven by spirit through history, Marx 
envisioned that it was capital, manifested in class, and how it was produced and distributed 
within a society that was the way in which development happened throughout history. Though 
Marx would also claim that the telos of this spirit that drives history was Freedom, he posits that 
it is those in control of capital, the bourgeoisie, that are acting in opposition to the march of 
history, Spirit, and trying to maintain their position of dominance over the proletariat class. He 
saw the dialectic in work through history as Feudalism gave way to Capitalism, which in turn 
was destined to give way to Communism as more people recognized the position they were in 
and sought freedom. 
When Marx and Engels wrote the first version of the Communist Manifesto in 1848 there 
were no paradisiacal communist societies. Their prognostications were based on a theory of 
historical economic progression and what the political response to it would be. In a way they 
agreed with Kant that cosmopolitanism is coming; however, they saw it being brought about not 
by an increasing tendency for nations to accept outside governance, but rather through the ever-
expanding nature of capitalist need for market. Though exploitative, capitalism has begun to 
“draw all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization” while undermining traditional 
national means of production (Marx and Engels 3). This new massive amount of uncontrolled 
production would inevitably lead to greater and greater commercial crises which would destroy 
large sections of the productive forces. These destructive forces will be felt most acutely by the 
proletariat, who is forced to work ever harder in low wage and low skill jobs to keep up with the 
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machines (Marx and Engels 6). Marx and Engels’ see the lives of the lower class becoming 
consistently worse despite the general increase in capital. The continuation of this trend will 
mean that the proletariat will long for the status that skilled workers had in the Middle ages and 
come together to destroy imported goods, machines, and finally the bourgeoisie in revolution. 
Some enlightened members of the bourgeoisie and the middle class will even assist the 
proletariat in this revolution, having the ability to see the auspicious historical situation. The 
lower middle class specifically is likely to help, knowing that they will soon fall into the 
proletariat anyway. Unlike in the past where revolutions were always championed by some 
subsection of the bourgeoisie, this revolution, being led by a conscious majority of the oppressed 
will allow the proletariat to rise together afterwards. Furthermore, with the destruction of the 
bourgeoisie and the middle class that did not side with the proletariat in the revolution, there will 
not be class oppression because only the proletariat will remain. “Its fall and the victory of the 
proletariat are equally inevitable” (Marx and Engels 9). 
This conception is so sure of itself that it is willing to call for the destabilization of 
systems that have not yet failed. Marx and Engels failed to see the possibility that technological 
progress would be beneficial to all, not just the bourgeoisie. There was also no mention of the 
potential for new work created by technological development. In the Marxist view, the life of the 
proletariat was downhill from around 1900 until they finally managed the end goal of 
overthrowing the bourgeoisie and establishing a one class society. Additionally, there was no 
mention in the Communist Manifesto about how this new society would ensure that differences 
in levels of productivity between its own members would not set the stage for the rise of classes 
once again. If the productivity of a person should be equivalent to the capital they receive, one 
could reasonably expect that the governing system would have to implement a system that would 
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go against the personal interests of the top 50% of the population, to maintain an equitable 
distribution across the class. This would of course require an almost impossible level of power to 
be held by the government to constrain the most productive members of society. While it is 
theoretically possible that the entirety of the surviving population could decide to go along with 
the programs out of an abiding feeling of comradery with the rest of their nation, it seems 
unlikely.  
Revolution, which was the way the that dialectical struggle played out in the Marxist 
conception of the world, is a difficult process. Though history was on the side of the proletariat 
and a utopian society of freedom would eventually be reached, capital, and through it, material 
power, was often in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This caused later political leaders such as 
Vladimir Lenin to devise ways through which the bourgeoisie can be overthrown in an 
accelerated manner. This would come most famously in the form of a Vanguard party, which 
would consist of those epistemologically privileged individuals who are able to perceive reality 
and recognize their place in history. This group would then set out to mobilize the proletariats 
into revolutionary action, destabilize the social order, and establish itself as the guiding force 
within the state (Gray 5). In many cases, the goal of overthrowing the current government of a 
state through revolutionary action leads to the justification of totalitarian actions on the part of 
the Vanguard party, perceiving even totalitarianism as a positive step away from the status quo. 
Vanguardism, specifically, uses their belief in the epistemological superiority of their own group, 
Elite Theory, a forcing of science to fit the historical orthodoxy of the party, and the 
demonization of those that disagree with them as fuel for their movement.  
This is exactly what happened in the formative example of the vanguard party which 
grew directly out from Lenin himself, the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were a communist 
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vanguard political party founded by Lenin that led the fight against the Russian Republic and 
seized power in 1917 through Red October. They would eventually shift into the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, most famously led by Stalin. Immediately upon taking power, Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks showed the deadly potential of their tactics by demonizing and calling for the 
murder of the Kulaks, resulting in mass food shortages in 1918. Additionally, around 50,000 
political enemies were killed in the Red terror of 1918. However, in the USSR, history trudges 
on and even those who were initially thought to be enlightened no longer held an anointed 
position. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin had control of the levers of power within Russia and 
set about getting rid of his political opponents, including many powerful communists. This can 
be most clearly seen in the Great Purge which saw 1.2 million deaths from repression between 
1937 and 1938 (Ellman 1163). This rhetoric continues along with the murder and imprisonment 
of successful farmers under Stalin, culminating in the Holodomor in Ukraine, which caused the 
loss of around 4 million lives in 1932-1933 (Motyl 2). Historian Robert Conquest estimates the 
number of excess deaths between 1926-1939 alone ranged from 16-18 million. Gulags, which 
can be read about in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago: An Experiment in 
Literary Investigation, functioned as work and death camps which were set up for political 
dissidents and held around 4.2 million people as of 1946 (Ellman 1153). 
Defenders of communism will often argue that the Soviet Union and Maoist China are 
not accurate representations of Marx’s dream. This defense is a version of the “no true 
Scotsman” fallacy, where instead of changing their hypothesis in the face of failed 
implementations of communism, they formed an ad hoc defense by denying that the state was 
really communist. If the Soviet Union, Maoist China, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Cuba, 
North Korea, Vietnam, Venezuela, and the rest of the failed projects that called themselves 
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communist were not in fact communist, the burden of proof lies on communism's defenders to 
show examples of where it has worked. If they then say that it has never been truly instantiated, 
then they risk playing mere theoretical games. It should be understood that political philosophies 
must be instantiated to really be able to analyze its consequences. 
The Soviet Union that was birthed from Marxist-Leninist philosophy ended up as an 
authoritarian system that ruled over the second largest number of governmental civilian killings 
in the 20th century, followed only by Mao in China. The activities of Mao and the rise of the 
authoritarian Communist Party of China closely followed the ideological development in Russia, 
with all its problems, and could have been used in the same way to show the practical horrors 
that follow from the historical deterministic framework. However, for the purpose of this paper, 
Russia was chosen largely due to it being the home of the underlying ideology. Germany, under 
the control of the Nazi Party, the third member in the estimated number of deaths of that 
triumvirate of evil that found itself empowered in the 20th century, shared similar ideas of 
history to the Soviets. 
 The stated goal of the Nazi party in Germany was very much in line with historical 
determinism and the belief that the spirit of a group was always developing towards a utopian 
end. Unlike the Soviets, who used economics and class as the basis for their claims, the Nazis 
used a theory of racial supremacy. This is due to the spreading ideologies of German ethnic-
superiority and anti-Semitism from thinkers on the right like Wagner, Gobineau, and H.S. 
Chamberlain. Similar to Hegel, Nazis put a massive emphasis on the importance of the National 
Spirit, which the Germans called Volk, encompassing the shared culture, language, and territory 
of a group (Hutton 150). The idea of the Volk was further augmented by racial theories of Aryan 
supremacy, which were made most popular by Arthur de Gobineau in his Essay on the Inequality 
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of Human Races. While Gobineau is not completely sold on the traditional biblical ascriptions 
for the origins of race as the descendants of Noah, he still takes the Biblical accounts seriously. 
He takes more issue with the notion that there is no such thing as different races. He explicitly 
states that the racial types are, “absolutely fixed, hereditary, and permanent, in spite of climate 
and lapse of time” (Gobineau 120).  
Though he admits that not much can be known about the original man which he calls 
Adamite, he differentiates the secondary types into black, white, and yellow. These are then 
broken down from their pure originations to still intermingled, but still distinguishable, tertiary 
types (Gobineau 147). Even from among the secondary types, Gobineau sees no equality. In 
beauty, strength, and intelligence, he argues that those closest to white are superior (Gobineau 
151-153). It is worth noting, given the way Gobineau’s theory will be taken, that Germans rank 
near the bottom of his list in beauty and strength.  The notion of the originals being pure is 
important to Gobineau’s overall narrative, which is that the intermingling of the types causes a 
degeneration of humanity and an increase in the disorder of the individual and larger society 
(Gobineau 25). He pushes this idea so far as to say the civilizations of his time wane in 
comparison to those ancient civilizations that have fallen like the Egyptian Pharaonic age, 
Ancient Greece, and the Roman Empire, which according to him, were made up of less 
degenerate elements (Gobineau 154). Gobineau’s view of Aryans as the purest group of whites 
from whom all civilization comes, requires a strict segregation to eliminate further degeneration, 
but not enough to eliminate other races.  
Gobinueau’s ideas were taken by Houston Stewart Chamberlain and adjusted in his book 
Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts to fit German ideas of the Volk. This included 
classifying “Semitic” as its own race instead of as a part of white. Similar to Gobineau, 
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Chamberlain thought that racial intermingling was the primary cause of the fall of civilizations. 
Going further, Chamberlain did not stop at claims of superiority and prescriptions of racial 
segregation. Chamberlain endorsed the destruction of groups that would challenge the superior 
race. A specific example of this in his writing is his approval of the annihilation of Carthage, 
which he saw as the ideal Semitic city, by the Romans. It is clear that for Chamberlain, the 
absolute destruction of Carthage was both inevitable in the face of the superior Roman people, 
and completely necessary for the progression of humanity (Chamberlain 115).  
Gobineau, Chamberlain, and other racial ideologues went to great lengths in their 
writings to try and legitimize his racial theories using history, linguistics, and the fledgling 
science of anthropology. During the 1800s into the mid 1900s, theories of racial superiority were 
common among the intelligentsia. What would today be considered pseudoscience, such as 
phrenology, was presented as evidence and gross generalizations about the races, was common. 
There are obvious problems with these narratives, some of which were known and argued at the 
time. The conflation of racial and language groups is foremost among these problems as Aryan 
was derived from linguistics not racial anthropology, and some Jews were native German 
speakers. Another problem was that the German Volk were not of one race according to the 
anthropologists (Hutton 150). As these problems became clearer, some ideas were dropped and 
replaced by new ones in order to continue movement toward the ultimate goal. An exemplar of 
this is the transition from the use of social anthropology and linguistics, due to the 
aforementioned issues, to eugenics. By 1935, even the words “arisch” and “Arier,” which is what 
was being translated as Aryan, fell into disuse (Hutton 151). However, pesky problems such as 
scientific illegitimacy would not stop true believers.  
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The pretense of scientific racial superiority and the belief in a singular group with the 
ability to produce civilization, kickstarted calls for radical change. The Nazis thought they knew 
that the pure Volk would eventually dominate, but believed that the more time that lesser groups 
were allowed to coexist, the more likely they were to intermingle and corrupt the most noble 
type. The solution to this problem required vast, uncontested government power to implement. 
The Nazis used similar tactics as the Soviets in order to gain this power. After November 
1918, the German population became aware of Germany’s surrender and the establishment of the 
Weimar Republic. Despite the defeats that the German army suffered during the war, there were 
many, including Hitler, that felt humiliated and betrayed by the “November Criminals” who had 
signed the armistice that ended the war. The German nationalists who felt this way shifted their 
ire onto the fledgling Weimar Republic and began trying to overthrow it. Hitler began 
positioning himself as a savior figure that would bring Germany into glory. Political gambling 
from inside of the Reichstag by high-ranking officials was terribly miscalculated as they 
attempted to bring the Hitler and his Nazi party under their control. They failed and in 1932, the 
Nazi Party won the most seats in the Reichstag out of any political party. Hitler outmaneuvered 
his opponents and was appointed Chancellor of the Reichstag. 
From Hitler's seat in power, he began repressing and murdering political opponents. 
When the Reichstag building burned to the ground in 1933, Hitler said that it was the sign to 
begin the communist revolution. He played on the fears of the German people and used the fire 
as the impetus to ramp up the political killings of communists, did away with the constitution, 
and outlawed most opposing political parties, with just under half of the German population 
supporting him (Houghton 36). Once he had weeded out the communists and liberals from 
society, he did the same with his own party, further radicalizing them. All the while, Hitler 
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framed the situation as if his murders were merely the putting down of rebellions that would 
have overthrown the government. With his enemies out of the way, he continued flirting with the 
army and heads of industry until they either supported him or were at the very least, not opposed. 
When the last bastion of moderation, President Hindenburg, died in 1934, Hitler took up the 
powers that Hindenburg had previously held and declared himself Fuehrer. At this time, he had 
around 90% of the vote in Germany and his reign of terror continued largely unopposed. Like 
Stalin, Hitler turned on those that helped him gain power. In June and July of 1934, Hitler purged 
the ranks of the S.A. and many powerful former allies including Ernst Roehm and Father 
Bernhard Stempfle of the Hieronymite order, who previously helped edit Mein Kamp (Shirer 
223). 
Hitler and his Nazi Party, while espousing one of the most abhorrent and violent 
ideologies that has ever been seen, managed to come to power more or less legitimately in 
Germany. The activities of the Nazi Party after setting off World War II through their invasion of 
Poland, would eventually lead to the death of millions, including six million Jews throughout the 
area that Hitler was able to control as part of the plan to establish a utopia that would last a 
thousand years. Their belief was that the Aryan race was superior to all others and that it was the 
destiny of the German people to be the rulers of the world. In order to do this, they had to first 
get rid of all of those that were impure. They did this both through murder and eugenics, 
believing in this task so strongly that even in the final years of the war when defeat seemed 
imminent, precious resources were still being used to carry out their racial cleansing. This was 
the power of the idea of the Thousand Year Reich. When combined with Hitler’s charisma, it 
enchanted Germany and led to the most destructive war the world had ever seen (Shirer 5). 
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Calling it the Thousand Year Reich closely mirrors the idea of millenarianism in more 
overtly religious groups. Millenarianism is the idea that in the future, there will be a fundamental 
remaking of the world and the social order as prescribed by a certain religion. After this pseudo-
apocalypse, a utopia will be established on the earth for believers to enjoy. Millenarianism and 
other forms of apocalyptic ideologies whether religious or otherwise, can be extremely 
dangerous because followers can take the idea of a future destruction as permission to take that 
destruction into their own hands. “Apocalyptic belief systems and millennial visions of the 
imminent “Last Days” or “End Times'' appear to characterize almost all violent religious sects'' a 
fact that is crucial when looking at the practical ramifications of this philosophy (Walliss 14). 
One important aspect of millenarianism is that salvation and admission into this utopian system 
is collective. All members of the chosen people will gain access; however, it is also a dualistic 
vision of the world. This means that those that are not part of the elect have chosen to side with 
the forces of evil in the world and will either be destroyed in the end times, or need to be 
destroyed to make way for the coming age. These groups also tend towards a charismatic leader, 
who marshals the group towards their goals. Being centralized around a single leader also tends 
to lead groups towards violence due to the instability that reliance on one person brings. These 
groups often also isolate themselves from the rest of society, either to preserve their own purity, 
or in an attempt to begin the utopia they believe is coming. 
While most millenarianist groups today are fringe, like People’s Temple and Aum 
Shinrikyo, the ideas of communal salvation after a worldwide destruction of the forces of evil are 
common themes throughout the Abrahamic religions. Two of the main differences between 
millenarianist groups and more mainstream religious groups is isolation and societal opposition. 
Isolation from society allows tighter control over the group members by the charismatic leaders 
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as well as some degree of freedom from the scrutiny of the rest of society. This increases the 
potential for ideological radicalization. Societal opposition engenders hate and worsens feelings 
of demonization and difference aimed at “others” (Walliss 30). 
While the millenarian form of historical determinism tends not to be extremely 
widespread, other religious forms are well known. Islam has been the unfortunate source and 
victim of one of the most shocking examples of historical determinist groups trying to impose 
their will. In Islam, the holiest site is the Kaaba, located inside the Great Mosque of Mecca, in 
Saudi Arabia. On a pilgrimage known as the hajj, which is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, 
millions of Muslims travel there each year to worship. Certain sects of Islam, believe in a form 
of historical determinism in which a holy figure called the Mahdi, is destined to appear, destroy 
the forces of evil, and create a perfect religio-political community, the umma, on earth 
(Sachedina 1). The idea of the Mahdi is similar in form to that of Messianic figures in Jewish and 
Christian thought. Shiites saw the Mahdi as both a religious and political leader who would be 
able to correctly interpret and implement the Sharia, in the same way as the Prophet Muhammad, 
to create the ideal Islamic society. The Mahdi, in Twelver Shi’ism, is the twelfth Imam, which 
refers to the line of purportedly infallible Imam successors of the Prophet Muhammad, following 
the lineage of Ali. The Mahdi who is coming is thought by Shi’ites to be Muhammad b. al-Hasan 
al-A’skari, the hidden twelfth Imam who went into occultation after A.D. 873 to avoid being 
killed by the Abbasid Dynasty (Sachedina 23). While the Mahdi is in occultation he is not 
manifest in the world, but interacts through imperfect spokesmen. This concept was incredibly 
important, to the point that “salvation was impossible if a person failed to recognize the true 
Imam of his time” (Sachedina 7). Following the lineage of Ali makes notions of the Mahdi a 
mainly Shia belief, though there are some Sunni groups that hold to this concept as well. The 
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necessity to recognize and follow the true Imam in order to reach salvation is a massive incentive 
to be obedient to those who claim the title of Mahdi and exists in both Sunni and Shia variants. 
The Wahhab sect of Saudi Arabia is one such Sunni group that believes in the return of 
the Mahdi and in 1979, a small group of Wahhabi extremists believed they had found the Mahdi 
in a man named Muhammad Abdullah al-Qahtani. In the hadiths it is said that the Mahdi will 
look similar to the Prophet Muhammad, have the same name, and be from the tribe of Quraysh 
(Trofimov 47). The Mahdi will then stand between the Kaaba and Ibrahim’s prayer station in the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca to be accepted by Muslims. Muhammad Abdullah al-Qahtani met the 
physical, nominal, and tribal requirements; all that was missing was his acceptance. The leader 
of the group who found the Mahdi was Juhayman al-Otaybi, a former member of the Saudi 
National Guard, who then joined the Salafi Sect Al-Jamaa al-Salafiya al-Muhtasiba, supported 
by well-known cleric Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz. While Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz was more mainstream 
than Juhayman, both were strongly against the modernization of Saudi Arabia, instead wanting 
increased enforcement of religious law (Hegghammer and Lacroix 105). Juhayman held some 
specifically violent beliefs about what would happen when the Mahdi returns, such as an army of 
70,000 Jews rising up against the Mahdi and being swallowed by the earth, then the Christians 
and Jews will be slaughtered (Trofimov 47). Juhayman and a group of a few hundred heavily 
armed followers were convinced of Muhammad Abdullah’s blessed status and were eager to 
begin their chiliastic movement. In order to help Abdullah fulfill the rest of the prophecy, 
Juhayman and his group made a plan to violently seize control of the Grand Mosque to set off 
the chain of events that would establish a Islamic Utopia. 
On 20 November 1979, the first day of 1400 of the Islamic calendar, Juhayman, 
Muhammad Abdullah, and around 300 armed men stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca and 
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took thousands of Islamic worshippers hostage (Hegghammer and Lacroix 112). With 
Muhammad Abdullah, their Mahdi, in the correct place, they fortified their positions and waited 
for the Jewish army to come and be destroyed. This never happened. It was the Saudi 
government who came to extract the Mahdi and free the hostages. After a two weeklong siege on 
the mosque by the Saudi government, the proposed Mahdi was dead along with hundreds of 
others (Trofimov 164). The remainder of Juhayman’s group was captured and either imprisoned 
or executed (Hegghammer and Lacroix 113). There was no divine intervention on behalf of 
Muhammad Abdullah and the revolution failed horrifically.  
In Marxist-Leninism, Nazism, and Millenarianism, a perspective of historical 
determinism lends itself towards violence and has been responsible for some of the biggest 
atrocities committed in the last 150 years. These ideas are dangerous because of the way they are 
able to both capture the imagination of a group of people that are seen as epistemologically 
privileged and destined for a future utopia, while simultaneously promoting a collectivist 
mentality that allows the trampling over of innumerable individuals. This gets particularly 
dangerous when believers take matters of bringing about this eschatological change themselves, 
as was the case in the three examples given. These dangerous tendencies most readily present 
themselves in the demonization of other members of society, and a focus on overthrowing the 
established social order. Out of all the groups that have been mentioned, a commonality is that 
their predictions have all been wrong. Though they claim history is on their side and that 
paradise awaits, a close study of history shows that no utopia has come, but rather violent 
adherents have caused mass suffering before themselves being purged by other members of their 
group, all destined not for earthly paradise, but for infamy in death. 
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It is not surprising that all of the groups have been wrong. Aside from the specific 
problems facing each of the cases given, historical determinism itself has issues. The scale of the 
proposed social changes, the violence required to force the rest of society to accept the changes, 
and the dubious methods that have been used for making predictions should all be understood. In 
each of the cases given success on the part of the revolutionaries would require a complete 
restructuring of civilization. The complexity that goes into ensuring a functioning society is such 
that only parts of its working can be understood at once, which is why studies isolate variables in 
order to know their effect (Popper 127). In trying to understand and mold all of society at one to 
fit their preconceived notions of the historical ends, historical determinists always run into 
unintended consequences. This is due to unforeseen interactions between parts of society that are 
unsettled by the rampant change. For every change made, a ripple effect will occur to social 
relations, whose change will then ripple again ad infinitum. This would require a similarly 
infinite knowledge to be able to successfully predict the outcome of, making holistic social 
change a logical impossibility (Popper 128). To be clear, in each of the examples adherents to 
historical determinism claim that change is predestined. However, they then attempt to impose 
themselves onto the social order to accelerate the course of history, which to anyone not 
convinced that this change is already determined looks like radical change. 
Given that historical determinism favors a small in-group of enlightened followers, it 
requires the ability to clear obstacles and opponents from its path. The violence and control 
required to force this acceleration worsens the problem of unforeseen events. The death and 
destruction that results from the violence necessarily makes it more difficult for those 
implementing policy in accordance with their ideology to correct for anything that goes wrong. 
This is even more of a problem in the context of the devoted historical determinist who is willing 
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to sacrifice untold numbers of individuals to reach their ends. Figures like Juhayman, Hitler, and 
Stalin, so convinced in the merits of their actions are unlikely to admit that anything can go 
wrong with their plans. So whatever course corrections might be possible in light of the 
destruction are ignored. 
Finally, the predictive methods used to determine where exactly history is going in order 
to help bring about that change must be scrutinized on an individual level. The impossibility of 
total knowledge of a society means that a forceful outside authority must be referenced. In 
Juhayman’s case this was God; in Hitler’s it is racial superiority preordained by a cosmic force, 
in Stalin’s conception it was economics. Economic interests can surely have an effect on the 
development and progression of a society. Theoretically so could divine intervention or some 
disparity in physical or mental ability between racial groups. Crucially, the force of conviction 
behind the belief in the truth of these assertions allowed disproving evidence to be ignored to 
disastrous effect.  
There is a strange irony in studying the results of actions said to be destined to meet their 
goals. Stalin watched as millions of workers were killed, starved, or sent to the gulag for not 
being loyal enough to the state. In order to create the conditions for a pure German Volk, Hitler 
sent an entire generation of Germans to die in a far-off land. Finally, in order to prove he found 
the Mahdi and usher in a golden age of Islamic rule, Juhayman desecrated the most holy site of 
his religion. In each case, the strength of their convictions was so great that they were willing to 
go to any length to impose their vision of the world on others, no matter who had to die. This is 
the danger of historical determinism, the combination of a small, epistemologically blessed 
group of followers, certain they are correct and willing to take extreme measures to accelerate 
their coming utopia are unable to be reasoned with. The merits of their actions are no longer 
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open to debate, the only thing that is left to do is to gather the coercive force required to impose 
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